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Compensation Representatives
A PRUDENT SOLUTION TO EXCESSIVE CEO PAY
Lawton W. Hawkins†
I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of CEO pay continues to garner significant
attention both in the popular press and among regulators. The
New York Times alone printed 339 stories dealing with
executive compensation in 2006.1 Moreover, the SEC received
more than twenty thousand comment letters before it approved
new compensation disclosure rules on July 26, 2006.2 SEC
Chairman Christopher Cox noted that “no issue in the 72 years
of the Commission’s history has generated such interest.”3 The
reason for the intense degree of interest is clear: CEO
compensation in the United States is extremely high, and is
getting higher. In 2003, the average CEO of a large U.S. firm
made 500 times the salary of the average worker.4 This

†
Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Professor, University of Washington School of
Law; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; B.A., Williams College. I would like to
express my thanks for the thoughtful comments and suggestions made by Professors
Richard Kummert, Todd Zywicki, and Dale Oesterle, as well as the participants at a
faculty colloquium held at Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. Needless to
say, all remaining errors are my own.
1
Culled from a January 13, 2007 Westlaw search of the New York Times
using “ceo or executive w/5 pay or compensation & da(aft 12/31/2005 & bef
01/01/2007).”
2
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (“SEC”), SEC Votes to Adopt
Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Related
Matters (July 26, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm [hereinafter
SEC Press Release]. For the full text of the executive compensation rules, see
Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53158 (Sept. 8,
2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249, 274). See also
infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text for a brief discussion thereof.
3
See SEC Press Release, supra note 2.
4
CEOs and Their Indian Rope Trick, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2004, at 61,
quoted in Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1615, 1619 (2005); Janice Revell, Mo’ Money, Fewer Problems; Is it a Good Idea to
Get Rid of the $1 Million CEO Pay Ceiling?, FORTUNE, Mar. 31, 2003, at 34, quoted in
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1 (2004) [hereinafter PWP].
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compares with 140 times worker salary in 1991.5 In absolute
levels, the average pay of CEOs in the S&P 500 has risen (in
constant 2002 dollars) from $3.7 million in 1993 to $9.1 million
in 2003.6 One study of executive compensation at publicly
traded firms with a market capitalization larger than $50
million found that, during the period from 2001 to 2003, these
firms’ top five executives received compensation equivalent to
9.8% of the firms’ aggregate earnings.7
Some commentators have argued that, for the good of
society, CEOs should not be allowed to receive such exorbitant
Others take the narrower position that,
compensation.8
irrespective of the impact on broader society, excessive CEO
pay clearly harms shareholders.9 Not only must shareholders
ultimately pay the bill, but to the extent that such pay levels
are pervasive throughout the market, it becomes difficult for
them simply to sell the shares of any offending companies.10
Thus, following the so-called “Wall Street Rule” would force
investors to exit the entire equity market, an obviously
untenable response.11
Still, despite overwhelming evidence that CEO pay is
extremely high, it does not follow that CEO pay is “excessive.”
A figure can only be considered excessive if it is higher than the
“correct” price, and numerous unanswerable questions confront
anyone attempting to determine the correct price for the
services of a CEO.12 For example: How many people actually
have the necessary skills to be a good CEO?13 How much better
is a given CEO than the other candidates?14 How much of the
company’s success or failure is attributable to the CEO?15
5

PWP, supra note 4, at 1.
Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 283, 285 (2005).
7
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview
of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 652 (2005).
8
See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem,
What’s the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP.
L. 675, (2005); Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a
Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 206-07 (1996).
9
Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 25-26 (2000).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See Gordon, supra note 8, at 677; Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the
CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 129, 144-46 (2003).
13
Snyder, supra note 12, at 144.
14
Id. at 146
15
Id. at 145.
6
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What is the “fair” allocation of profits as between the CEO and
the shareholders?16 Does “excessive” refer to an absolute pay
level, or is pay excessive only if, whatever the amount, it is
insufficiently tied to actual performance?17 In the face of such
unanswerable questions, one is left with the market. In short,
a fair price for a CEO is the price the market will bear. But
one can use the market to legitimize ostensibly excessive CEO
compensation only if the market is “fair,” in the sense that it
has not been manipulated by the participants.
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, in their seminal book
Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive
Compensation, condemn CEO pay for just such manipulation.18
According to Bebchuk and Fried, boards of directors and CEOs
do not engage in real arm’s length bargaining over CEO pay.19
Rather, CEOs exert “managerial power” to extract economic
rents above and beyond what they could have obtained in an
arm’s length negotiation.20 The result is excessive CEO pay,
insufficiently aligned with the CEO’s performance.21
To
address the problem, Bebchuk and Fried propose granting
shareholders greater power vis-à-vis the board of directors.22
For example, they would allow large shareholders to nominate
candidates for the board, and would require the company to
pick up the expenses for any proxy fight if the shareholder’s
nominee received more than a designated minimum level of
support.23
Bebchuk and Fried’s book has received considerable
academic attention, with some commentators taking issue with
its conclusion that CEOs are in fact overpaid,24 and others
objecting to its proposed remedies.25 This article accepts the
book’s fundamental point that the CEO pay-setting process is
flawed and that reforms are necessary.
Nonetheless, it
recognizes that high CEO pay may be attributable to numerous
factors other than managerial power, and it questions whether
16

Id. at 146.
Without answering this question, I will be using the term “excessive” to
refer to both scenarios.
18
See PWP, supra note 4.
19
Id. at 61-64.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 201-16.
23
Id. at 210-12.
24
See infra Part III.
25
See infra Part IV.
17
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certain of Bebchuk and Fried’s proposed solutions might, by
altering the balance of power between shareholders and
directors, have unintended negative consequences for matters
beyond CEO pay. Therefore, to remedy the process problems
identified by Bebchuk and Fried, this article suggests that
shareholders of those corporations with excessive CEO pay can
and should amend corporate bylaws to enable qualified large
shareholders to appoint non-executive “compensation
representatives.”26 Compensation representatives, who would
have no right to manage the corporation, would look after the
interests of all shareholders on matters relating exclusively to
CEO pay. This article contends that the use of compensation
representatives could address the most significant problems
described in Bebchuk and Fried’s book, without fundamentally
altering the traditional relationship between the shareholders
and the board of directors. As such, it would constitute a
prudent solution to the problem of excessive CEO pay.
Part II of this article discusses in detail Bebchuk and
Fried’s thesis, as well as their suggested reforms. Part III
describes and evaluates a number of objections to their
managerial power thesis.
Part IV discusses the many
objections to Bebchuk and Fried’s proposal to permit large
shareholders to place board nominees on the corporate ballot.
Part V introduces the compensation representative approach
and outlines its numerous advantages over both the current
system and the reforms suggested by Bebchuk and Fried. Part
V addresses the feasibility of the compensation representative
approach under existing law. Part VI raises and responds to
potential objections to the compensation representative
approach and concludes by demonstrating that adoption of a
compensation representative system is justified by its low costs
coupled with its potential benefits to shareholders.

26

See infra Part V.
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THE MANAGERIAL POWER THESIS

A.

Bebchuk and Fried’s Problems with Current CEO
Compensation

453

1. Factors Enabling CEOs to Exert Managerial Power
over Compensation
Ideally, say Bebchuk and Fried, boards and CEOs
should engage in arm’s length bargaining over CEO
compensation.27 In such a scenario, boards would vigorously
negotiate to receive the best deal for the benefit of the
company’s shareholders. In fact, argue Bebchuk and Fried,
CEOs exert managerial power to ensure that their
compensation is superior to what they would receive in an
arm’s length bargain.28 Bebchuk and Fried point to five major
factors that enable CEOs to exert managerial power. First,
although most compensation committees are comprised of
independent directors, CEOs have significant control over who
will serve on the board from which the committee members will
be drawn.29 Although exchange rules no longer permit CEOs to
serve on the nomination committee, a nomination committee is
unlikely to propose directors opposed by the CEO.30 CEOs are
not likely to support a critic of high executive pay.31 As longtime General Electric CEO Jack Welch told an audience of
recently appointed CEOs:
Put someone in charge who is nearing the end of their career, so
they’re not jealous of you as a younger CEO, is immensely rich,
much richer than you, and enjoys seeing other people get rich. . . .
Never, ever make a distinguished academic your compensation
committee chair because you’ll be a poor man by the end of it.32

Warren Buffett, a long-time critic of excessive CEO pay, had in
mind a similar tendency when he noted, “Though I have served
as a director of twenty public companies, only one CEO has put

27

PWP, supra note 4, at 17-18.
Id. at 23-44.
29
Id. at 26.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
See Symposium, The Media and Executive Compensation: A Panel
Discussion, 30 J. CORP. L. 795, 796-97 (2005) (statement quoted by Matthew Bishop).
28
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me on his comp[ensation] committee. Hmmmm . . .”33 Second,
CEOs are in a position to steer benefits to board members,
though their ability to do so has been reduced by the 2003
changes to listing standards of the major securities
exchanges.34 Third, social and psychological factors discourage
board members from bargaining aggressively with CEOs over
compensation.35 Friendship, loyalty, and team spirit encourage
directors to be pliant, often at the expense of the interests of
parties, such as shareholders, who are present at the table.36
Also, board members who are highly paid CEOs in their own
right are likely to rationalize high CEO pay as being in the best
A former SEC commissioner
interests of shareholders.37
described it more nefariously as the “giraffe effect”:
The compensation committee, composed solely of outside directors
who were CEOs of their own public corporations, knew that what
goes around comes around. Pushing the pay envelope for the CEO
who had selected them for his board was only natural, since they
would not want anyone they were associated with to rank in the
bottom half of surveys, and getting CEOs’ scale up could only help
them when their scales were reviewed by their outside directors.38

Fourth, since board members typically own only a very small
fraction of the company’s stock, and since the reputations of
directors are unlikely to suffer from approving a CEO’s pay
package unless the terms of the package are truly egregious,
directors who comply with CEO pay demands will usually not
pay a high financial or reputational cost.39 Finally, the limits to
board members’ time and information all but compel them to
rely on the advice provided by the company’s human resources
department and the compensation consultants that have
traditionally been hired by that department.40

33

Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire
Hathaway, Inc., to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb. 28, 2006),
available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2005ltr.pdf.
34
PWP, supra note 4, at 27-28.
35
Id. at 32.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 33.
38
Bevis Longstreth, A Real World Critique of Pay Without Performance, 30
J. CORP. L. 767, 769 (2005).
39
PWP, supra note 4, at 34-36.
40
Id. at 36-37. As discussed infra text accompanying note 197, New York
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) rules now require that a compensation committee’s charter
give the committee sole power to retain and fire the compensation consultant. Still, a
compensation committee will likely make its decision based in part on the
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2. Existing Mechanisms Cannot Effectively Constrain
Pay in the Face of Managerial Power
a. Shareholder Litigation
Bebchuk and Fried argue that existing mechanisms
such as litigation, shareholder voting, the labor market, the
market for corporate control, and the product market, cannot
effectively constrain pay in the face of managerial power.41
Litigation’s effectiveness is blunted by both the procedural
hurdles placed in front of shareholder plaintiffs and the
extremely high standard applied to challenges to executive
compensation.42 In order to prevail, plaintiffs in a shareholder
litigation must establish that either (i) when nominally
independent directors approved CEO compensation, they were
in fact engaged in a self-dealing transaction for their own
personal benefit, or (ii) the compensation scheme constituted
“waste,” that is, it was so egregious that no rational person
could have approved it.43
The difficulty of using shareholder litigation to
challenge extraordinary pay was recently confirmed in the
Delaware case In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation.44 In
Disney, the Delaware Court of Chancery was called upon to
rule whether Disney directors had breached their fiduciary
duty when, among other things, they approved an employment
contract for Michael Ovitz which entitled Ovitz to a ninety
million dollar severance package after a mere fourteen months
as President of Disney.45 The court indicated that, prior to

recommendation of the firm’s human resources department, which is ultimately
responsible to the CEO.
41
Id. at 45-65.
42
Id. at 45-48.
43
Id. The difficulty of prevailing in a waste claim was colorfully expressed by
the Delaware Court of Chancery:
Absent an allegation of fraud or conflict of interest, courts will not review the
substance of corporate contracts; the waste theory represents a theoretical
exception to the statement very rarely encountered in the world of real
transactions. . . . [R]arest of all—and indeed, like Nessie, possibly nonexistent—would be the case of disinterested business people making nonfraudulent deals (non-negligently) that meet the legal standard of waste!
Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *13-14 (Del. Ch. July 18,
1995).
44
No. Civ. A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 09, 2005), aff’d, No.
411, 2006 WL 1562466 (Del. June 8, 2006).
45
Id. at *25.
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Ovitz’s termination, “the Disney board had never met in order
to vote on, or even discuss, the termination at a full
session . . . . [T]he Disney directors had been taken for a wild
ride, and most of it was in the dark.”46 In describing the
boardroom culture at Disney, the court wrote of “how
ornamental, passive directors contribute to sycophantic
tendencies among directors and how imperial CEOs can exploit
this condition for their own benefit, especially in the executive
compensation and severance area.”47 It described CEO Michael
Eisner’s relationship with other board members as follows:
By virtue of [Eisner’s] Machiavellian (and imperial) nature as CEO,
and his control over Ovitz’s hiring in particular, Eisner to a large
extent is responsible for the failings in process that infected and
handicapped the board’s decisionmaking abilities. Eisner stacked
his (and I intentionally write “his” as opposed to “the Company’s”)
board of directors with friends and acquaintances who . . . were
certainly more willing to accede to his wishes and support him
unconditionally than truly independent directors.48

Nonetheless, despite board conduct that contained “many
lessons on what not to do,”49 the Court of Chancery held, in a
decision affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court,50 that the
Disney directors had not violated their fiduciary duties.51
b. Shareholder Voting
If litigation provides no real constraint on excessive
compensation, what about shareholder voting? Bebchuk and
Fried argue that it too is inadequate in the face of managerial
power.52 It is true that in certain instances, such as the
adoption of a stock option plan, the major exchanges’ listing
rules require that a corporation submit the plan to a
shareholder vote.53 However, the vote does not effectively
46

Id.
Id. at *28 n.373.
48
Id. at *40 (internal citation omitted).
49
Id. at *39 (emphasis added).
50
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2006 WL 1562466, at *33-34.
51
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2005 WL 2056651.
52
PWP, supra note 4, at 48-51.
53
See, e.g., NASDAQ Rule 4350(i) (2006); NYSE Listed Company Manual
303A.08, http://www.nyse.com/lcm (follow the “Click here to open the NYSE Listed
Company Manual” hyperlink, the “Section” hyperlink, the “Section 3 Corporate
Responsibility” hyperlink, the “Section 303A Corporate Governance Standards”
hyperlink, and the “Section 303A.08 Shareholder Approval of Equity Compensation
Plans” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
47
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constrain CEO compensation since it concerns only general
matters, such as the total number of options that may be
issued under the plan, rather than the compensation of any
particular executive.54 It is also true that Section 162(m) of the
Internal Revenue Code disallows deductions for compensation
exceeding $1 million per executive unless it is “performance
based.”55 One of the requirements for “performance based”
compensation is that the material terms of the excess amount
over $1 million be approved by a majority of the shareholders
in a separate vote.56 However, even if shareholders are
knowledgeable enough to vote intelligently on compensation
issues,57 they are constrained by the fact that they are not
presented with any alternative to the plan approved and
proposed by the board.58 Therefore, if the shareholders were to
reject the board’s plan before an alternative became available,
senior management could resign and throw the company into
crisis.59 To prevent this, a board might simply pay executives
the cash equivalent of the rejected plan, since the exchange
rules do not require a shareholder vote on cash compensation.60
That result could make shareholders even worse off, since cash
payments would not necessarily be linked to performance of the
stock price. If shareholders did not approve the compensation,
it would not be deemed “performance based,” and amounts over
$1 million would not be tax deductible.61
c. “Outrage Costs” and “Camouflage”
In addition to arguing that litigation and shareholder
voting cannot effectively constrain CEO pay, Bebchuk and
Fried assert that neither the labor market, the market for
corporate control, the capital market, nor the product market

54
PWP, supra note 4, at 49. See also Developments in the Law—Corporations
and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2213 (2004).
55
I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006).
56
Id.
57
This is not always a valid assumption, given the complexity of the
documents and the frequent need to tailor the details of the compensation plan to the
specifics of the particular industry. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The
Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021,
1033-34 (1999).
58
PWP, supra note 4, at 49.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 49-50.
61
Id.
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constrains executive pay.62 Thus, the only remaining restraints
on inappropriate compensation are “outrage costs,” which
Bebchuk and Fried define as outsiders’ negative reactions to
unjustified, abusive, or egregious pay practices.63 Even outrage
costs can be rendered ineffective, since companies endeavour to
camouflage the extent and form of their compensation.
Because perceptions are so important, the designers of compensation
plans can limit outside criticism and outrage by dressing, packaging,
or hiding—in short camouflaging—rent extraction. . . . [M]anagers
will prefer compensation practices that obscure the total amount of
compensation, that appear to be more performance based than they
actually are, and that package pay in ways that make it easier to
justify and defend.64

Indeed, the very fact that CEOs feel the need to camouflage
their pay (as is not the case with movie stars, athletes, and
other highly paid stars) strongly suggests to Bebchuk and
Fried that most compensation packages are not arrived at by
arm’s length negotiation.65
Examples of camouflage cited by Bebchuk and Fried
include: long-time managerial resistance to the expensing of
options;66 the widespread use of tax-inefficient supplemental
executive retirement plans or “SERPs,” which do not enable the
company to reap tax benefits, but may allow CEOs to reap
camouflage benefits;67 deferred compensation arrangements,
which permit the CEO to enjoy an undisclosed, above-market
rate of return prior to vesting;68 and post-retirement perks and
consulting compensation, which need not be disclosed because
the recipient is no longer CEO at the time he receives the
For example, Bebchuk and Robert Jackson
benefits.69
conducted a study of the pension plans among the CEOs of the
Fortune 500 who either retired during 2003 or the first five
months of 2004, or were at or close to retirement age in 2004.70
Although the companies were not required to disclose the total

62

Id.
Id. at 65.
64
PWP, supra note 4, at 67.
65
Id. at 21.
66
Id. at 150.
67
Id. at 97-100.
68
Id. at 105.
69
Id. at 110.
70
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J.
CORP. L. 823, 826 (2005).
63
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costs of such plans to shareholders,71 they were required to
disclose the existence of the plans and the method for
determining the annual benefit.72 Only by examining each
company’s proxy materials, 8-K filings, and CEO employment
contract, as well as by estimating the likely payout by taking
into account factors such as each CEO’s tenure at the company,
age, and expected life span, were the authors able to estimate
the costs of such plans to shareholders.73 They found that, for
recently retired CEOs, the average cost exceeded $21 million,
and for incumbent CEOs between the ages of sixty-three and
sixty-seven, the average cost exceeded $26 million.74
According to Bebchuk and Fried, unrestrained
managerial power, coupled with camouflage, leads to “pay
without performance,” in which CEOs enjoy extraordinarily
high pay irrespective of whether they increase shareholder
value.75 For example, CEOs of companies in the S&P 500
averaged $2 million in cash salary and bonus in 2002, but the
variation in cash pay among the CEOs was not correlated to
performance relative to their respective industries.76 Although
option grants were meant to overcome the alignment problems
found in cash compensation, Bebchuk and Fried point out that
standard, non-indexed, at-the-money option grants77 often
provide CEOs with windfall benefits.78 After all, the rise in a
71
Id. at 828. New rules approved in July 2006 will require companies to
include a pension benefits table disclosing the actuarial present value of each of the
accumulated benefits under each pension plan of the CEO and other designated
executives. See supra note 2.
72
Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 70, at 828.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 837-38.
75
Id. at 831.
76
PWP, supra note 4, at 122-23.
77
In a standard, non-indexed, at-the-money grant, the CEO receives the
option at any time during a designated period (typically ten years) to purchase shares
of the company at the market price (known as the “exercise” or “strike” price)
prevailing as of the date of the grant. Thus, for example, if the CEO received 100
options at an exercise price of $20 and five years later, he or she exercised the option
when the market price for the stock was $40, the CEO would reap a benefit of ($40$20) x 100, or $2,000. An “in-the-money” option would set the exercise price below the
market price on the date of the grant, while an “out-of-the-money” option would set the
exercise price above the market price on the grant date. If the option were indexed,
then the exercise price would rise or fall in tandem with a specific index, such as the
S&P 500. In the foregoing example, assuming that the option was indexed to the S&P,
and the S&P increased 50% over the five-year period, the exercise price would also rise
50% to $30. The CEO’s gain on exercise would be reduced to ($40-$30) x 100, or $1,000.
See THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MODERN FINANCE 83-89 (1992) (defining and
discussing “option pricing theory”).
78
PWP, supra note 4.
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given company’s stock may simply be part of a general rise in
the market, resulting from the mere passage of time, or from
circumstances beyond the CEO’s control, such as a reduction in
interest rates.79 Although boards could solve much of the
windfall problem by “indexing” options so that the exercise
price would rise or fall in tandem with a given index, such as
the S&P 500, indexed options are rare—a fact that Bebchuk
and Fried view as further support for the managerial power
thesis.80 And while boards do not index options upward, they
do often re-price them downward when the shares drop deeply
out of the money, essentially providing CEOs with a gift,
despite the poor performance of the company’s shares.81
An even more egregious practice, which has come to
light since the publication of Bebchuk and Fried’s book, has
been the widespread use of backdated options, particularly,
though by no means exclusively, among high technology

79
Id. at 138-39. Warren Buffett has pointed out another method by which
CEOs can ensure that, over time, the value of un-indexed stock options will increase—
consistently withholding dividends and buying back company stock. Buffett imagines a
Company called Stagnant Corporation, which has granted a ten year, at-the-money
option to its CEO, Fred Futile, to purchase 1% of the company. During the ten year
period Stagnant Corporation enjoys no growth, each year earning $1 billion on $10
billion net assets, equal to $10 per share on each of its outstanding 100 million shares.
If, rather than paying any dividends, Fred uses the $1 billion to repurchase shares, and
the shares continue to sell at 10 times earnings, the shares will have appreciated 158%
over the ten years. “That’s because repurchases would reduce the number of shares to
38.7 million by that time and earnings per share would therefore increase to $25.80.
Simply by withholding earnings from owners, Fred gets very rich, making a cool $158
million, despite the business itself improving not at all.” Letter from Warren E. Buffett
to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., supra note 33, at 16.
80
PWP, supra note 4, at 141-43. There may be good reasons, however, not to
index option grants. For example, suppose Company A’s board indexed CEO options to
the movement of the S&P 500. If the S&P dropped 10% while Company A shares
stayed flat, shareholders might complain that Company A’s CEO is being unfairly
rewarded for the fall in the price of other shares. Or imagine the CEO of Big Oil, Inc.
As a result of rising oil prices, the S&P plummets as Big shares rise spectacularly.
Big’s CEO would be doubly rewarded for events beyond his control. In order to avoid
the problem of sectors whose stocks move counter to a broad index, Big’s stock options
could be tied to the “energy sector.” But defining the sector could be difficult, and it
could open the way to manipulation ex ante. Query: was Enron in energy or financial
services? If, in order to avoid definitional problems, Big indexed options to the stock of
a few companies in its peer group, the pay to Big’s CEO could vary wildly simply as a
result of a large scandal at, or a large windfall to, a competitor. Even a perfectly
designed index could present new problems. Saul Levmore has suggested that
indexing options might encourage CEOs to take on excessively risky projects, since
they will receive the same payout (zero) from their options whether they index returns
or take a big risk that fails spectacularly, but will receive a huge payoff if their gamble
succeeds. Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1901, 1922-23 (2001).
81
PWP, supra note 4, at 165-67.
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companies.82 Options granted on a given date are made
effective retroactively, as of a date when the stock price was
lower.83 This decreases the exercise price of the option and
enables executives to reap a larger benefit from the option
grant. Despite the claim that stock option grants incentivize
executives to increase the company’s stock price in the future,
backdating rewards executives merely for short term volatility
in the recent past.84 SEC investigations into the practice have
only just begun, but one academic study using statistical
analysis of 7,774 companies’ stock option grants between 1996
and 2005 has found that an estimated 29.2%, or 2,270
companies, manipulated stock grants at some point.85 Even in
those companies that do not engage in backdating, Bebchuk
and Fried point out that CEOs can often blunt the risks (and
alignment of interests) associated with stock options by selling
their shares promptly upon exercise of the underlying options
or by hedging against the performance of the shares, thereby
protecting themselves against a future drop in the company’s
stock price.86 In short, Bebchuk and Fried make a persuasive
case that, as a result of managerial power, executive pay is
both higher and less aligned with shareholder interests than it
would be if it were determined by arm’s length bargaining, and
they demonstrate the current difficulty facing those who would
challenge objectionable pay arrangements.
B.

Bebchuk and Fried’s Proposed Solutions

Bebchuk and Fried indicate that their primary goal is to
call attention to the problem of executive compensation, rather
than to propose solutions.87 Nonetheless, they do suggest
several specific reforms. First, they advocate steps to enhance
transparency, such as expensing options, placing a monetary
value on all compensation, and disclosing what fraction of
executives’ option gains resulted from performance that was
82
Eric Dash, Study Finds Outside Directors Also Got Backdated Options,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at C2.
83
Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Clarifies Accounting for Backdated Options, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 20, 2006, at C7.
84
Id.
85
Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top
Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?, ___ J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming
2007) (on file with author).
86
PWP, supra note 4, at 176-79.
87
Id. at 189.
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superior to that of its industry peers.88 These suggestions are
relatively uncontroversial; several have already been
implemented. For example, since fiscal year 2006, companies
have been required to expense employee stock option grants.89
Furthermore, the newly-approved disclosure rules, to be
effective December 15, 2006, will require companies to disclose
in tabular form the actuarial present value of the accumulated
benefits under each pension plan of the CEO and other
designated executives.90 Indeed, the new rules include an
additional reform not mentioned by Bebchuk and Fried: the
requirement that the company insert into the proxy statement
a “compensation discussion and analysis” statement, written in
plain English and signed by the CEO and Chief Financial
Officer.91
Disclosure alone will not solve what is arguably the
most significant problem in the pay-setting process—the
board’s lack of accountability to the shareholders. Therefore,
Bebchuk and Fried advocate strengthening the influence of
shareholders in three ways.
First, they would require
companies to obtain specific shareholders’ approval for certain
“suspect” forms of compensation, such as non-indexed options,
re-priced options, and large severance payments.92 Second,
they would grant shareholders more say in the appointment
Currently, while
and reappointment of directors.93
shareholders have the right to elect directors, nominations for
directorships of a publicly-traded company are made, not by
the shareholders, but by the nomination committee of the
board itself.94
Bebchuk and Fried would permit any shareholder who
for one year has held, say, five percent of the shares to gain

88

Id. at 192-94.
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 107, 70 Fed. Reg. 16693 (Apr. 1, 2005)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211).
90
Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542,
6611-12 (Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229.402(c), 228.402(c), 229.10).
91
Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6611
(Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229.402(b)).
92
PWP, supra note 4, at 195-98.
93
Id. at 195-96.
94
See NYSE Listed Company Manual 303A.00, http://www.nyse.com/lcm
(follow the “Click here to open the NYSE Listed Company Manual” hyperlink, the
“Section” hyperlink, the “Section 3 Corporate Responsibility” hyperlink, the “Section
303A Corporate Governance Standards” hyperlink, and the “Section 303A.04
Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
89
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access to the corporate ballot for board elections.95 Instead of
the existing rule, which requires a shareholder to pay its own
costs in any proxy fight,96 Bebchuk and Fried would require the
company to cover the costs of proxy campaigns that garner
significant support.97 Third, Bebchuk and Fried would give
shareholders the power to initiate changes to the corporate
charter.98
III.

OBJECTIONS TO THE MANAGERIAL POWER THESIS

The managerial power thesis has drawn considerable
criticism among commentators. Some have claimed that CEO
pay in the United States is not in fact excessive, but that high
CEO compensation is justified by the size and complexity of
large organizations.99 For example, one commentator has
pointed out that asset managers, who seem to have less
complex duties than CEOs, typically receive a higher
percentage of “assets under management” than CEOs, even
after accounting for the asset managers’ costs of doing
business.100 Surely, he argues, CEOs are entitled to pay on par
with that of asset managers.101
As for international
comparisons,102 one commentator has posited four possible
explanations for the relatively high pay of U.S. CEOs:103
(i) U.S. CEOs contribute more to their firms’ value than do
foreign CEOs; (ii) the tournament to become a U.S. CEO is
95

PWP, supra note 4 at 197-98.
Currently, Rule 14a-8, pursuant to which a shareholder can shift the costs
of a proxy proposal by compelling a corporation to place it on the corporate proxy, is not
available for disputes over the election of particular board members. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-8 (2005). See infra notes 166-74 and accompanying text for further discussion
of Rule 14a-8.
97
PWP, supra note 4, at 210-11.
98
Id. at 212-13. Bebchuk and Fried also suggest that companies should link
CEO pay more closely to performance by indexing options, limiting executives’ ability
to unwind holdings, and avoiding “soft landings” in which unsuccessful CEOs are given
generous severance payments upon departure. Id. at 190-91.
99
Joseph E. Bachelder, Comments on Pay Without Performance, 30 J. CORP.
L. 777, 781-82 (2005).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
The international compensation differential may be shrinking.
See
Geraldine Fabrikant, U.S.-Style Pay Deals for Chiefs Become All the Rage in Europe,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at A1 (noting that the differential between U.S. and
European CEOs is declining as European CEOs demand pay in line with that of their
U.S. counterparts).
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Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board
Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1176-80 (2004).
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bigger, due to the greater power U.S. CEOs wield compared to
their foreign counterparts; (iii) U.S. executives are more mobile
and can change companies in order to receive higher pay; (iv)
the presence of poison pills and the absence of control
shareholders in U.S. companies has shifted bargaining power
to management.104
Other commentators have argued that even if CEO pay
is high, it can nonetheless be justified since, over time, U.S.
shares have performed better than those of markets where
CEOs are paid less.105 Certainly, rational shareholders would
prefer to pay an extra $1 million to CEOs if that would lead to
an additional shareholder return in excess of $1 million.
Still other commentators have attempted to refute the
managerial power thesis by pointing out that increased CEO
pay is part of the larger labor market phenomenon known as
the “superstar effect.” The superstar effect takes hold in
markets where, as a result of the large scale of an organization,
even small differences in the quality of those responsible for
the organization’s success can have extremely large impact on
the organization’s results. This leads to dramatic increases in
the compensation at the top of such organizations.106 Various
types of stars, other than CEOs, have been enjoying large pay
increases as the scales of their organizations have increased
over time. For example, professional baseball players have
been receiving significantly higher pay as the amount of money
in professional baseball has been increasing, even though
baseball players cannot manipulate the negotiation process.107
Similarly, as corporations get larger, such that even slightly
better management can cause a dramatic increase in total
shareholder value, one could expect that CEO pay would rise as
well, whether or not CEOs exert managerial power.108 And
indeed a recent empirical study of CEO compensation at S&P
500 companies between the years 1980 and 2003 has argued
that the six-fold increase in CEO pay during that period can be
explained by the six-fold increase in the asset value of the
104

Id.
John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without
Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1165-66 (2005); Ira T. Kay, CEO Pay for
Performance: The Solution to “Managerial Power,” 30 J. CORP. L. 785 (2005).
106
See generally Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON.
REV. 845 (1981).
107
Snyder, supra note 12, at 155-59.
108
R. Glenn Hubbard, Pay Without Performance: A Market Equilibrium
Critique, 30 J. CORP. L. 717, 718 (2005).
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companies in the S&P 500 over the same period.109 While the
mere fact that recent increases in CEO pay have tracked
increases in company size does not prove that current pay
levels are appropriate,110 it does suggest that not all of the
increases in CEO pay can be attributed to managerial power.
Bebchuk and Fried have also been faulted for failing to
distinguish between the legitimate bargaining power of
talented people and the illegitimate manipulation of the
negotiation process.111 One study of CEO compensation during
the years 1992 to 2000 indicated that externally hired CEOs,
who do not tend to have power over the existing board, made on
average ninety-six percent more compensation than CEOs
hired from within the corporation.112 This finding implies that
the high salaries of outsiders result from their strong, but
legitimate, bargaining power.113
Other commentators concede that boards and CEOs do
not engage in idealized arm’s length bargaining over CEO
salaries, but deny that the arm’s length negotiation model is
the correct standard by which to judge the negotiations.114
They claim that the relationship between the CEO and the
board (or company) would be best described as a long term
109
Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So
Much? (MIT Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper No. 06-13, 2006), available at http://www.
ssrn.com/abstract=901826.
110
For one thing, it is not clear that the pay levels in 1980 were themselves
appropriate. For another, it seems implausible that running a 2003 sized corporation
requires six times the effort that it did to run a 1980 sized corporation. And even
assuming that a CEO is entitled to more pay for running a larger company, one might
expect that as companies grow larger, CEOs would be called upon to offer “volume
discounts” as other commercial actors do, in which case pay, as a percentage of assets
at least, would have decreased since 1980.
111
Snyder, supra note 12, at 152-55.
112
Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power
Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 853-54 (2002).
113
Bebchuk and Fried attempt to address this point by arguing that the
directors would still have a strong incentive to please the new externally-hired CEO,
since he or she would have influence over the director’s re-election prospects. The
directors may also be disinclined to bargain with the CEO candidate over pay, since
they “want to get things off to a pleasant start.” PWP, supra note 4, at 40. Yet this
hardly explains why the pay of externally hired CEOs would be higher than that of
internal hires. A better argument might begin by pointing out that managerial power
distorts the market price for all CEOs. Since an externally hired CEO is often either
the CEO of another firm or an executive who has the possibility of one day becoming
CEO, a firm wishing to hire externally would need to compensate the candidate for the
forgone opportunities in his current role. In that sense, externally hired CEOs may be
indirect beneficiaries of the widespread exercise of managerial power in the market for
CEOs generally.
114
See, e.g., Longstreth, supra note 38, at 767-68; Snyder, supra note 12, at
149-52.
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relational contract.115 In such contracts, parties tend not to
fight for every advantage, but recognize that a given
negotiation is only part of a broader relationship.
The directors’ perception that they should support the CEO, their
reluctance to override substantive decisions except under unusual
circumstances, and their desire to be part of the “team” are not
necessarily abdications of authority but may instead reflect the
board’s view that the long-term interest of the corporation is
furthered by cooperation and team-building.116

As a senior consultant and former board member of Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement
Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) succinctly put it, “[b]oards have to
be tough. They have to be collegial at the same time,
Or, to use the words of a former SEC
though.”117
Commissioner, “[m]oney may be ‘left on the table.’ And, yet,
the best interests of shareholders may have been served.”118 If,
instead, a board adopted an overly adversarial attitude towards
the CEO, the costs to shareholder returns could outweigh any
benefits arising from robust CEO pay negotiations. For
example, the CEO could simply withhold information from
board members he or she considered hostile, thereby rendering
the board less effective.119
Turning to the specific pay practices criticized by
Bebchuk and Fried, such as non-indexed at-the-money options,
Kevin Murphy claims that there is a better explanation than
managerial power for their widespread adoption.120 Boards
may simply have considered such options a “cheap” form of
compensation, since they require no immediate cash outlay
and, until recently, they did not need to be treated as an
expense for accounting purposes.121 On the other hand, risk
averse and undiversified managers discount the value of high

115

Snyder, supra note 12, at 149.
Id. at 151. See also Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of
Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and
Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 810 (2001) (suggesting that collegiality is necessary to
enable mutual commitment and to make consensus-reaching practical).
117
Kenneth West, Pay Without Performance: An Executive’s Perspective, 30 J.
CORP. L. 791, 792 (2005).
118
Longstreth, supra note 38, at 768.
119
See Bengt Holmstrom, Pay Without Performance and the Managerial
Power Hypothesis: A Comment, 30 J. CORP. L. 703, 711-12 (2005).
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Murphy, supra note 112, at 859-60
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risk options, and demand large option grants in lieu of cash.122
In short, boards’ and managers’ respective assessments of the
cost and value of such options may explain their increased use
better than does managerial power alone.123 As evidence of
this, one study found “that nearly 80% of [the] options granted
in S&P 500 Industrials, S&P 500 Financials, and New
Economy firms in 2000 were granted to executives and
employees below the top five,” presumably employees without
significant power over the board.124 Thus, critics of Bebchuk
and Fried have countered the managerial power thesis with a
variety of plausible arguments.
IV.

REACTIONS TO BEBCHUK AND FRIED’S PROPOSED
REFORMS

Given the controversy surrounding Bebchuk and Fried’s
diagnosis of the problem of CEO pay, one could expect similar
reactions to their proposed solutions. In fact, as described in
this part, while commentators have not objected to their
proposals to increase transparency, they have raised numerous
objections to their proposals to allow shareholders to appoint
nominees to the board and to initiate changes to the corporate
charter.
Critics have pointed out that institutional
shareholders are often unwilling to become engaged in the
internal matters of corporations in which they invest, since
their costs in time and liquidity would likely exceed the
expected benefits.125 Rational institutional investors would
rather sell the shares of companies that destroy shareholder
value (either through inappropriate payment practices or
otherwise) than hold on to under-performing shares long
enough to effect the necessary improvements.126
Moreover, commentators note, one cannot assume that
those shareholders who are willing to become engaged in
corporate governance issues will necessarily promote the
financial interests of all the corporation’s shareholders.
122

Id. at 859.
Id. at 857.
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Id.
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Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751-52 (2006).
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Id. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder
Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 629-33 (2006); Olin Kramer, Pay Without
Performance: The Institutional Shareholder Perspective, 30 J. CORP. L. 773, 774-75
(2005); Thomas & Martin, supra note 57, at 1034.
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Delaware Vice Chancellor Strine makes the point as follows:
“Those institutions most inclined to be activist investors are
associated with state governments and labor unions, and often
appear to be driven by concerns other than a desire to increase
the economic performance of the companies in which they
invest.”127 For example, a large union pension fund might
threaten to mount a proxy fight for the election of board
members who would accede to the union’s wage demands.
Indeed, some have argued that such a scenario was at the
heart of the decision by California Public Employees’
Retirement System (“CalPERS”) (a former president of which
was the regional director of the United Food and Commercial
Workers) to withhold support for the election of the Safeway
CEO, following a strike at Safeway.128
Commentators have also pointed out that, even
assuming shareholders do not pursue non-economic agendas,
differing types of shareholders could have widely divergent
interests.129 For example, a hedge fund with a short term
investment horizon might clamour for policies that sacrifice
long term interests for short term gain.130 Similarly, diversified
shareholders (who have eliminated firm-specific risk) might
advocate the implementation of projects that undiversified
shareholders would consider to be too risky.131 Companies
generally attempt to reconcile these divergent interests by
placing the authority to make decisions on behalf of the
corporation into the hands of the board of directors.132 Courts
facilitate this centralization of authority when they apply the
business judgment rule133 to insulate most board decisions from
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Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1759, 1765 (2006); see also Bainbridge, supra note 125, at 1754-55.
128
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UCLA L. REV. 561, 590 (2006).
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Id. at 577-92.
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Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW.
461, 468 (1992).
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The business judgment rule has been characterized by the Delaware
Supreme Court as “a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
Absent a showing of fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being uninformed, a
court will defer to the business judgment of the directors, and will not substitute its
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shareholder challenge.134 Granting shareholders greater power
might enhance the board’s accountability, but only at a cost to
board authority.135 To exacerbate matters, Bebchuk and Fried’s
proposal could make directors more accountable, not to
shareholders generally, but simply to those shareholders that
attempted to assert their newfound power. As demonstrated
above, there is no guarantee that the assertive shareholders’
interests are always aligned with those of other shareholders.136
In short, commentators have pointed out that Bebchuk and
Fried’s proposed reforms could entail great costs. Thus, they
should only be undertaken if they would bring shareholders
even greater benefits.
Turning to the putative benefits of Bebchuk and Fried’s
proposed reforms, critics have argued that they would be
rather small in comparison to the costs described above. After
all, they argue, there is evidence that despite the absolute size
of CEO pay, the amounts involved may not be material to

judgment for that of the board. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
958 (Del. 1985).
134
See Dooley, supra note 132.
The business judgment rule can only be understood as intended to protect the
authority of the board and thus to promote the value of Authority. . . . [T]he
power to hold a party accountable is the power to interfere and, ultimately,
the power to decide. Thus, affording shareholders the right to demand
frequent judicial review of board decisions has the effect of transferring
decision-making authority from the board to the shareholders.
Id. at 470.
135

Stephen Bainbridge describes the dichotomy between authority and
accountability as follows:
A complete theory of corporate governance . . . requires balancing the virtues
of discretionary fiat against the need to ensure that such power is used to
further the interests of shareholders. Because the power to hold to account
differs only in degree and not in kind from the power to decide, fiat and
accountability also are antithetical.
Bainbridge, supra note 125, at 1747 (internal citations omitted). Or, as he states
elsewhere in the same article: “[T]here are limits on one’s ability to reduce agency costs
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work.” Id. at 1741.
136
Commentators have pointed out a number of other unintended
consequences that might arise if shareholders had the power to nominate board
members. For example, perfectly independent board members who significantly
improve compensation practices might nonetheless be unqualified to fulfil other more
important tasks, such as selecting good projects and making good investment decisions.
The net result could be negative for shareholders. See Core et al., supra note 105, at
1162-63.
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shareholders.137 If shareholders really felt that CEO pay was a
material concern, one would expect that they would often reject
option plans submitted for shareholder approval. In fact, a
study of shareholder voting on stock option plans during the
1998 proxy season found that less than one percent failed to
receive the approval of shareholders.138 One former SEC
Commissioner put the materiality point forcefully as follows:
The Chartered Financial Analysis Institute, representing more than
70,000 money managers, investment advisers, and Chartered
Financial Analysts (CFAs), teaches CFAs how to study a corporation
and how to determine what matters and what does not matter in
assessing the buy, sell, or hold decision. It even teaches CFAs about
the voting decisions and how, with professional confidence, to reach
conclusions on which many will rely. The CFA represents the best of
the breed. When and if they start to attribute telling importance to
executive compensation arrangements in deciding what to
recommend, this matter will become important to investors . . . .
Until this time comes, the issue, by definition, lacks
materiality . . . .139

In sum, critics have opposed Bebchuk and Fried’s
proposed solutions due to their concern that, once empowered,
shareholders would either fail to use their new power, or would
use it to the detriment of the corporation. In any event, they
argue, the costs associated with the reforms would likely
outweigh the benefits.
V.

COMPENSATION REPRESENTATIVES: A PRUDENT
APPROACH

The controversy can now be summarized as follows:
Bebchuk and Fried have pointed out numerous defects in the
process for determining CEO pay, and have demonstrated how
the process falls short of the ideal of the arm’s length
negotiation.140 They have argued that the defects have led to
excessive CEO pay, largely attenuated from CEO performance.
137
See Loewenstein, supra note 9, at 11 (referencing a study indicating that
had the CEOs of the 1000 largest US corporations worked without compensation in
1992, shareholder returns would have increased by only 0.06%).
138
Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder
Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 58 (2000).
139
Longstreth, supra note 38, at 770-71. But another explanation for CFAs’
apparent apathy is that, to the extent that the excessive compensation is endemic to
publicly traded U.S. corporations, CEO pay is not material for determining relative
returns. If, however, CEO pay were to decline or to become better aligned with actual
performance, material benefits would accrue, especially to the diversified investor.
140
See supra Part II.A.
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To address the problem, they have suggested, among other
things, making boards more responsive to shareholders by
empowering shareholders (i) to specifically approve certain
“suspect” forms of compensation, (ii) to nominate directors, and
(iii) to initiate changes to the corporate charter.141 Critics have
responded by arguing that CEO pay may not, in fact, be
excessive, and that CEOs may simply be using their legitimate
bargaining power to command high pay.142 They have justified
mega option grants by noting that options are viewed by the
corporation as inexpensive and by CEOs as risky.143 As for
Bebchuk and Fried’s proposal to increase shareholder power,
critics have argued, in effect, that the proposed cure is worse
than the disease, especially since the amounts involved may
not be material to investors.144
A.

Reconciling the Debate

The arguments on both sides of this debate appear to
have merit, but can they be reconciled? To a certain degree,
the answer is yes. On the one hand, the recent increases in the
compensation of highly talented persons generally, along with
the demonstrated correlation between company size and CEO
pay, do imply that not all of the rise in CEO compensation is
attributable to managerial power. Critics of Bebchuk and
Fried also have a point when they argue that, as Vice
Chancellor Strine put it, “the current American approach to
corporate governance appears, on balance, to produce good
They are therefore right to be skeptical of
results.”145
significant changes to the balance of power between boards and
shareholders, particularly while there is some question
regarding the financial materiality of CEO pay to shareholders,
the putative beneficiaries of reform.146 On the other hand, it is
141

See supra Part II.B. For other proposed reforms, see, e.g., Charles M.
Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board – The History of a
Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127 (proposing that all directors be paid only in
stock of the relevant corporation); Holmstrom, supra note 119 (proposing the
institution of generally accepted compensation practices, analogous to GAAP, which
can be audited); Loewenstein, supra note 9 (proposing that shareholders be allowed an
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This article does not take a position on whether allowing shareholders to
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important to note that none of the critics have defended the
existing pay-setting process, except by claiming that arm’s
length negotiations by a divided and adversarial board could be
even worse.147 Even a prominent critic of the managerial power
thesis implicitly admitted that the process is seriously flawed
when he made the following concession:
Judgment calls tend systematically to favour the CEO. Faced with a
range of market data on competitive pay levels, committees tend to
err on the high side. Faced with a choice between a sensible
compensation plan and a slightly inferior one favoured by the CEO,
the committee will defer to management. . . . The amounts at stake
in any particular case are typically trivial from a shareholder’s
perspective, but the overall impact of the bias has likely contributed
to the ratcheting of pay levels [described in this article].148

B.

Adopting a System of Prudent Reform
1. Characteristics of Prudent Reform

What then should be done? In view of the uncertainty
regarding the extent of excessive pay, as well as the risks
associated with adopting radical changes to corporate
governance, reformers should strive to adopt a prudent
approach that addresses the process problems without
simultaneously creating new problems. Prudent reform would
have five distinct characteristics. First, it would insert into the
compensation-setting process parties who are immune to CEO
pressure and responsive to shareholder concerns. Second, it
would address compensation process flaws in a targeted way,
with minimal spill-over into other areas of corporate
governance. In other words, it would not fundamentally alter
the existing balance between directors and shareholders, or
jeopardize the collegiality of many well-functioning boards.
Third, it would provide a substantial enough improvement over
the existing system to justify its adoption. It would further the
interests of shareholders, while being mindful of the limits and
possible disadvantages, discussed above, of direct shareholder
involvement.
It would avoid imposing on shareholders
demands that exceed their expertise or costs that exceed
concerns. It simply argues that shareholder nominations may constitute too strong a
remedy if the primary concern is executive compensation.
147
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
148
Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 2485, 2518 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999).
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expected benefits, and it would involve shareholders only to the
extent likely to promote the long-term interests of the
corporation. Fourth, prudent reform would be achievable with
minimal changes to existing law, a particularly important
characteristic since one could expect that powerful members of
the business lobbying community would strongly resist
significant legal changes that might be viewed as impinging on
power of directors or threatening the pay of CEOs.149 Finally,
prudent reform would be flexible. Rather than requiring
significant changes to all firms, irrespective of individual
circumstances, it would allow arrangements to be tried in the
marketplace and vindicated or discredited by the market
itself.150
2. The “Compensation Representative”
Bearing in mind the foregoing principles for prudent
reform, this article proposes that shareholders of those
corporations with excessive CEO pay should amend corporate
bylaws to create a special non-executive position, tentatively
entitled “compensation representative,” to represent the
interests of shareholders with respect to CEO compensation.
The amended bylaw could provide that the three largest
eligible shareholders of the corporation, acting by consensus,
would appoint the compensation representative. If they are
unable to agree on a candidate, they may submit the decision to
a neutral arbitrator of their choosing. In order to be eligible to
participate in the appointment of the compensation
representative, a large shareholder must: (i) have held its
shares for at least one year; and (ii) not have material business
149
A case in point is provided by the modest reforms that the SEC proposed in
2003 in order to enhance shareholder nomination rights in limited circumstances. See
Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60784 (Oct. 23, 2003) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274). The negative reaction by the Business Roundtable and
other lobbying organizations was decisive.
According to the SEC staff, “The vast
majority of commentators supported modifying the proxy rules and regulations related
to the nomination and election of directors. Commentators who did not support such a
modification included all of the corporations and corporate executives, most of the legal
community, and the majority of associations (mostly business associations).” SEC Div.
of Corp. Fin., Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and
Election of Directors (July 15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
proxyrpt.htm. The reforms were ultimately not adopted.
150
Prudent reform would not set a ceiling on CEO pay, whether in absolute
terms or as a multiple of worker salaries. If, as some commentators claim, high CEO
pay results from the limited supply of exceptional CEOs and their legitimate use of the
resulting bargaining power, a corporation should not be restricted from awarding
appropriately high compensation.
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dealings with the company, other than in its capacity as a
shareholder. Finally, to help guard against opportunistic
behavior, both the appointing shareholders and the
compensation representative would be required to sign an
agreement with the company requiring them to fulfil their
duties under the system in the interests of the shareholders as
a whole.151
a. Rights and Duties of the Compensation
Representative
Compensation representatives would not have the right
to vote either as members of the compensation committee or
the board of directors. They would not be authorized to
manage the business or affairs of the corporation. Their rights
and duties would instead be limited to the following: (i) to
attend all compensation committee meetings (formal or
informal), as well as all board of director meetings, to the
extent such board meetings concern CEO compensation
matters; (ii) to inspect all documents relating to CEO
compensation;
(iii)
to
demand
compensation-related
information
from
compensation
committee
members,
compensation consultants, and other board members; (iv) to
advise and give opinions on CEO compensation matters,
including its form, amount, conditions for receipt, and timing;
(v) to submit to compensation committees any objections to
proposed compensation plans, and, in the event that the full
board participates in the determination of CEO compensation,
to submit objections to the full board; and (vi) finally, if
unsatisfied with the response of compensation committees or
boards, as the case may be, to submit objections to the
shareholders that appointed them. Following receipt of a
compensation representative’s objections, an appointing
shareholder could take any action thereon which it saw fit. For
example, one or more of the appointing shareholders could
meet with members of the compensation committee to learn
more about the reasons for the proposed compensation package
and to discuss ways in which it might be improved. In extreme
cases, as discussed below, an objecting shareholder could force
the corporation to include in its proxy a proposal to reject any
151
For a discussion of other protections against possible conflicts of interest
between appointing shareholders and other shareholders of the corporation, see infra
notes 158-60 and accompanying text.

2007]

COMPENSATION REPRESENTATIVES

475

portions of the compensation package submitted for
shareholder approval. It could also force the corporation to
include in the proxy pay-related precatory proposals, in which
the shareholders formally recommend that the board take
certain actions without purporting to require that the board do
so.152
b. Advantages of a Compensation Representative
System
There are numerous advantages to the compensation
representative system over either the current system or the
reforms proposed by Bebchuk and Fried. First and foremost,
the use of a compensation representative would address the
most serious process problem raised by Bebchuk and Fried—
the current failure of boards to adequately represent the
interests of shareholders.
It would insert into the
compensation process a party who is beholden not to the CEO,
but to the shareholders.
Since the compensation
representative would not be nominated or appointed by the
board or CEO, he or she would be less susceptible to
managerial power than are directors under the current system.
Moreover, the large shareholders that appointed the
compensation representative would have a sufficient stake in
the corporation to ensure that the representative would be
accountable to the shareholders; and representatives who wish
to be repeat players would have a strong incentive to develop a
reputation for protecting shareholder interests.
The compensation representative proposal is preferable
to Bebchuk and Fried’s proposals, since it is a targeted
response to the specific problem of CEO compensation. Its
effects would not spill over into other matters, since the role of
a compensation representative would be limited to
investigating and advising on compensation matters, and
would not extend to the management of the corporation’s
affairs.
This limited role ensures that the use of a
compensation representative would not substantially alter the
traditional balance of power between a corporation’s board and
its shareholders.153 It also would enable a compensation
152

See infra notes 166-88 and accompanying text.
Presumably, Bebchuk for one would not view this limited role as a virtue,
since he feels that granting shareholders greater rights would benefit corporate
governance more generally. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
153
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representative, who would not be a board member, to be tough
with the CEO without sacrificing board collegiality. The
representative could serve as the “bad guy,” making it easier
for the board to take a harder line with the CEO. Rather than
telling the CEO, “Bob, we don’t think you’re worth that much,”
a board with a compensation representative could say, “Bob,
we’d love to grant you the additional one hundred thousand
options—and we really think you deserve it—but if we do, that
S.O.B. is going to make a big stink about it, and the publicity
would be bad for all of us.”
One might argue that a compensation representative
provides no improvement on the current system. After all,
shareholders are already entitled to vote on significant portions
of most compensation packages.154 However, a system that
merely allows shareholders the right to reject an inappropriate
proposal is clearly inferior to one that could prevent the board
from submitting the inappropriate proposal in the first place.
A compensation representative could become engaged in the
details of the compensation package early in the process. He or
she would be in a position to detect manipulation, excess, or
potential CEO windfalls from the outset, before the
compensation committee or the board presents its
recommendation to the shareholders. Take an example in
which a huge bonus is conditioned upon the CEO’s
achievement of certain objective goals.
A diligent
compensation representative would be better able than
shareholders to judge whether the goals could be achieved
easily or only through extraordinary CEO performance. He or
she could encourage the compensation committee to adopt
demanding goals and could otherwise influence the details of
the package to ensure the alignment of pay with performance,
all prior to the shareholder vote. Furthermore, a compensation
representative certainly would be better able than
shareholders to detect and object to egregious practices such as
the backdating of option grants.
Another advantage to a compensation representative
system is that compensation representatives would likely
become repeat players, working with more companies than
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 865-70 (2005) (arguing that shareholder
value would be increased if shareholders were allowed to initiate changes in the
corporate charter, to nominate board members, to change the company’s state of
incorporation, and to initiate mergers and similar transactions).
154
See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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even the most active and sought after board member. Over
time, they could develop expertise, market knowledge, and
insight into the proper design of compensation packages, as
well as into the way such packages can be manipulated. Thus,
compensation representatives could not only benefit the
shareholders, but they could also educate the compensation
committee and board of directors on compensation best
practices, thereby alleviating another problem identified by
Bebchuk and Fried, the limits on the time and information
available to independent directors.155
The early involvement of a compensation representative
would also benefit shareholders in those (hopefully rare)
instances where the inclusion of a shareholder proxy proposal
became necessary. Currently, as mentioned above, when
shareholders vote on a compensation scheme, they are not
generally provided with an alternative to the board’s proposal,
and may therefore feel compelled to approve inappropriate
arrangements.156 If, however, a shareholder were to respond to
the compensation representative’s objections by including a
proxy proposal under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the shareholder would have 500 words in which to
state not only its objection to the board’s proposal, but the
material terms of the recommended alternative pay
arrangement, thereby providing a real alternative to the
Regardless of whether the general
board’s proposal.157
shareholders ultimately accepted the shareholder proposal, its
very inclusion in the proxy could encourage directors to be
more transparent regarding executive pay, since they would
need to clearly justify their proposed arrangements in response
to the specific objections set forth in the shareholder proposal.
What about the potential dissention and conflict among
participating shareholders? Since neither the compensation
representative nor the appointing shareholders would be
engaged in the management of the corporation, the likelihood
of significant conflict among shareholders would be small. All
shareholders would benefit proportionally if a compensation
representative either lowered CEO pay, enhanced CEO
performance, or both.158 However, if a conflict were to arise
155

PWP, supra note 4, at 36-37.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
157
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c), (d) (2005). For details regarding the use of Rule
14a-8, see infra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
158
Anabtawi, supra note 128, at 593.
156
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between long and short term shareholders, the proposal set
forth in this article specifically favors long term shareholders,
since only shareholders who have held their shares for at least
one year could participate in the appointment of the
compensation representative.
Likewise, conflicts between
insiders and outsiders would be resolved in favor of outsiders,
since shareholders with material business dealings with the
corporation could not participate in the appointment of the
compensation representative.159
What if a shareholder wished to use the compensation
representative to sabotage the corporation for private gain?
Imagine, for example, that Company S, the largest shareholder
of Company A, owns one percent of Company A, as well as
twenty percent of Company B, a competitor of A. What if
Company S tried to appoint an unduly aggressive and
confrontational compensation representative in order to force
the CEO of A to resign, to the detriment of Company S’s
investment in Company A, but to the much larger benefit of its
investment in Company B? Or imagine scenario two, in which
Company S tried to use the compensation representative to
force Company A to acquire Company B at an excessive price,
enabling Company S to capture a large premium on its
investment in Company B sufficient to offset the loss on its
smaller investment in Company A? Finally, imagine scenario
three, in which Company S, a large financial institution,
manages Company A’s very profitable pension program. What
if Company S hesitated to appoint a hard-nosed compensation
representative, for fear of jeopardizing its relationship with the
CEO of Company A?
The proposal set forth in this article presents significant
hurdles to all three scenarios. As to scenario one, even if a
shareholder wanted to use the compensation representative to
force the resignation of a valuable CEO, it could not likely
convince the other two appointing shareholders to appoint such
a representative. If a bad faith compensation representative
threatened to contest the board’s compensation proposal unless
his or her demands were met, the threats would ring hollow,

159
See Parthiban David et al., The Effect of Institutional Investors on the Level
and Mix of CEO Compensation, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 200, 205 (1998) (an empirical study
indicating that institutional investors that have merely an investment relationship
with the firm influence compensation in accordance with shareholder preferences, but
that institutional shareholders that depend on the firm for their own business have no
such influence).
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since unreasonable proxy proposals would likely be rejected by
the full shareholder vote.160 A shareholder’s attempt to effect
scenario two would be subject to the same difficulties as
scenario one. In addition, the shareholder in scenario two
would be stymied by the fact that a compensation
representative cannot engage in the management of the
corporation, making it difficult for the representative to
pressure the corporation to take specific actions, such as a
merger. Finally, as for scenario three, the use of a lap-dog
compensation representative would be no worse than the
current system, in which the board makes its decision without
the input of any shareholder representative. In any event, the
precise scenario described could not occur, since shareholders
with significant commercial dealings with the corporation
would be excluded from the appointment process.
c. A Compensation Representative System is
Feasible Under Existing Law
Assuming that the proposal set forth in this article
would, if implemented, benefit shareholders, is it feasible
under existing law? Very much so. In fact, as described below,
it could be implemented in Delaware without the active
involvement of courts, legislatures, or, perhaps most
importantly, company boards.161 Under existing Delaware
corporate law, a company’s bylaws would simply need to be
amended to grant the three eligible shareholders the right to
appoint a compensation representative having the rights and
duties described above. In Delaware, this bylaw amendment
could be effected by either the board of directors or the
shareholders. Under Section 109(a) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, the power to adopt, amend, or repeal the
bylaws is held by the shareholders, provided that the certificate
of incorporation may confer such power on the board.162 But
“[t]he fact that such power has been so conferred upon the
160
Rule 14a-8 would allow Company S to include the same compensationrelated proxy proposals whether or not the company has a compensation
representative. The participation of a bad faith compensation representative would
add little to the threat posed to the CEO from such a proposal.
161
In this sense, the proposal set forth in this article differs from Bebchuk and
Fried’s proposal to force companies to pay the costs for board proxy contests that
receive sufficient support. Under current law, all such costs must be borne by the
contesting shareholders.
162
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2001).
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directors or governing body, as the case may be, shall not divest
the stockholders or members of the power, nor limit their
power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.”163 The Revised Model
Business Corporation Act provides both boards and
shareholders with similar rights to amend bylaws.164 Under
the reasonable assumption that most boards would not
unilaterally propose such a bylaw amendment, shareholders
who meet certain rather easy eligibility requirements165 may,
under SEC Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
compel the corporation to include it in its proxy.166
Rule 14a-8(i) provides, however, that a company may
exclude a proposal from its proxy “[i]f the proposal is not a
proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the
Recently,
jurisdiction of the company’s organization.”167
Professor Bebchuk has attempted to use Rule 14a-8 to propose
that CA, Inc. (formerly Computer Associates International,
Inc.) amend its bylaws to limit the board’s ability to issue
poison pills.168 Such proposals, however, are subject to the
objection that they conflict with Section 141(a) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law, which provides: “The business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall
be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its
certificate of incorporation.”169 Indeed, the conflict with Section
141(a) was the stated reason that the board of CA, Inc. refused
to include the proposal in its proxy. Neither the SEC nor the
163

Id.
Article 10.20(a) of the RMBCA provides that “[a] corporation’s
shareholders may amend or repeal the corporation’s bylaws.” Article 10.20(b) permits
the board of directors to amend or repeal the bylaws as well, but gives shareholders the
final word, since the board may not amend or repeal bylaws if “the shareholders in
amending, repealing, or adopting a bylaw provide that the board of directors may not
amend, repeal, or reinstate that bylaw. See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 10.20(b)(2) (2003).
165
Under Rule 14a-8(b), in order to be eligible to submit a proposal, a
shareholder must have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the
company's securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one
year by the date the shareholder submits the proposal, and must continue to hold those
securities through the date of the meeting.
166
SEC v. Transamerica, 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947).
167
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2006).
168
See Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 738 (Del. Ch. 2006).
169
For a discussion of the conflict under the corporate law of Delaware and
other states between corporate law provisions granting shareholders the right to pass
and amend bylaws and those granting the board of directors the power to manage the
affairs of the corporation, see generally Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws,
Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205 (2005).
164

2007]

COMPENSATION REPRESENTATIVES

481

Delaware courts have expressed an opinion on the merits of the
board’s refusal; the former refusing to grant a no-action letter
pending the resolution of the matter under Delaware law,170
and the latter refusing to decide the matter on ripeness
grounds.171 The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, when
interpreting provisions of its corporate code which are
substantially identical to those of Delaware, held in a similar
case that the shareholders may propose a bylaw to require
shareholder approval for the issuance of poison pills.172
In any event, an adverse ruling on Bebchuk’s CA, Inc.
proposal would not seem to cast doubt on the legality under
Delaware law of a compensation representative bylaw, since
the two bylaws could be clearly distinguished. Delaware
General Corporation Law provides that bylaws “may contain
any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate
of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the
conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or
powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”173
Unlike Bebchuk’s proposed bylaw, a bylaw merely calling for
the appointment of a compensation representative could not be
said to conflict with Section 141(a), since the representative
would be explicitly precluded from managing the business or
affairs of the corporation. Neither would the bylaw conflict
with articles of incorporation that explicitly grant the
compensation committee or the board of directors the authority
to determine officer and director compensation. After all, the
compensation representative would not be a member of either
the compensation committee or the board, nor would he or she
have the authority to vote on the actual compensation being
proposed. He or she would merely represent the interests of
shareholders and call to their attention compensation plans
that shareholders might find objectionable. The legality of a
bylaw calling for a compensation representative is further
strengthened by Section 141(h), which permits corporations to
use bylaws to restrict the compensation of directors.174
170

Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 1547985, at *1
(June 5, 2006).
171
Bebchuk, 902 A.2d at 737.
172
See Int’l Bd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Co., 975 P.2d 907, 908
(Okla. 1999).
173
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2001).
174
“Unless otherwise restricted by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws, the
board of directors shall have the authority to fix the compensation of directors.” Id.
§ 141(h) (emphasis added).
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Another possible hurdle to the use of bylaws to adopt
compensation representatives might be found in Rule14a8(i)(8), which allows companies to exclude from the proxy a
proposal which relates to an election to “the board of directors
or analogous governing body.” Apart from the obvious fact that
a compensation representative is not a board member and does
not otherwise have the right to govern the affairs of the
company, the ability of companies to use Rule 18a-8(i)(8) to
exclude shareholder proposals has been weakened by the
recent Second Circuit holding in American Federation of State,
County & Municipal Employees v. American International
Group, Inc.175 The court held that a shareholder proposal to
require that AIG include certain shareholder board nominees
on the corporate ballot under Rule 14a-8 could not be excluded
from the corporate proxy materials.176 The court rejected the
SEC’s interpretation of its own rule, holding that, although
Rule 14a-8(j)(8) would allow a corporation to exclude specific
nominees from an election, it would not allow it to exclude a
bylaw proposal to permit shareholder nominees to be included
on the corporate ballot in the future.177 A fortiori, a company
should not be able under Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to exclude a
resolution relating to a mere compensation representative.
Once the bylaw has been approved by the shareholders,
no further legal issues should arise unless and until a
compensation
representative
objects
to
the
board’s
compensation plan and a shareholder submits a proxy proposal
calling on the shareholders to reject it. If the proxy proposal
concerns a portion of the plan that is subject to a shareholder
approval, there should be no legal hurdles to the proxy
proposal, since the proposing shareholder would simply be
exercising its right under the securities law.
Thus, for
example, a shareholder could include a proxy proposal to reject
an equity-based compensation plan, since the listing rules of
both the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ require that
Similarly, a
the shareholders approve any such plan.178
shareholder could include a proxy proposal regarding any
individual’s compensation in excess of $1 million for which the

175

Am. Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l. Group, Inc.,
462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006).
176
Id. at 123.
177
Id. at 127.
178
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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corporation wished to claim a deduction under § 162 (m) of the
Internal Revenue Code.179
More problematic would be a shareholder proxy
proposal that purported either (i) to reject other portions of a
compensation plan for which neither the tax law nor the
exchange rules requires a shareholder vote, or (ii) to compel the
corporation to adopt a specific compensation plan that had not
already been proposed by the board. Whether or not a
corporation could exclude such proxy proposals would depend
upon state corporate law since, as discussed above, Rule 14a-8
allows a corporation to exclude any proposal that is invalid
under the law of the corporation’s jurisdiction of organization.180
Therefore, the legality of a proposal to reject, for
example, cash compensation under $1 million would depend in
Delaware on whether the corporate charter or bylaws
permitted the shareholders to approve officer and director
compensation in such a case. Certainly, a corporation could
amend its charter to require such a vote. Under Delaware law,
however, any charter amendment must be first initiated by the
board, following which the shareholders must approve it.181 It
seems unlikely that many boards would unilaterally initiate
charter amendments that subject their compensation decisions
to a shareholder vote. As for bylaw amendments, their terms
are generally subordinate to contrary provisions in the
charter.182 Thus, a shareholder could probably only initiate a
bylaw amendment to require a shareholder vote on executive
compensation if the charter contained no contrary provision.183
The same problem would confront a proxy proposal
purporting to compel the board to adopt a compensation plan
containing specific terms. Such a proposal would not be valid
unless a provision of the charter or bylaws actually granted
shareholders the right to dictate executive compensation, as
opposed to simply granting them the right to approve a plan
proposed by the board. Presumably such a provision would be
rare, certainly among listed companies, all of which are
required under exchange rules to appoint compensation
179

See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
181
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2001).
182
See, e.g., Gaskill v. Gladys Belle Oil Co., 146 A. 337, 340 (Del. Ch. 1929).
183
But, in view of the potential conflict of interest, it is not inconceivable that
a court in equity could give preference to the bylaws. See Gow v. Consol. Coppermines
Corp., 165 A. 136, 138-42 (Del. Ch. 1933) (holding that a bylaw determining the
number of directors prevails over a contrary clause in the charter).
180
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committees satisfying criteria specified by the relevant
exchange.184
Although a corporation could exclude a proxy proposal
to reject certain portions of a pay package or to compel the
board to adopt a particular compensation plan, a shareholder
could still require the company to include a non-binding, or
“precatory” proxy proposal.185 Some may be skeptical of the
effectiveness of precatory proposals, since they have tended not
to garner significant shareholder support. A study of such
proposals in the 1994 proxy season conducted by Randall
Thomas and Kenneth Martin found that precatory proposals
relating to compensation garnered, on average, support of only
12.8%.186 However, precatory proposals submitted on the
recommendation of the compensation representative should
have greater credibility among shareholders than have past
precatory proposals, which were often made by shareholders,
such as unions or governmental actors, who held non-financial
objectives. Another empirical study by the same authors
relating to the 1993-1997 proxy seasons found that
“shareholders are statistically more likely to support executive
compensation proposals that raise corporate governance issues
than those that raise social responsibility issues.”187 Still, one
might wonder whether, if a precatory proposal were to pass,
the board would act on it, since it has no legal obligation to do
so. Yet Thomas and Martin’s study found that in the two-year
period following the inclusion of compensation-related
precatory proposals, total compensation declined by a
statistically significant average of $2.7 million, although not a
single proposal they studied actually passed.188 One can expect
184
See, e.g., NYSE Listed Company Manual Rule 303A.05(a), http://www.nyse.
com/lcm (follow the “Click here to open the NYSE Listed Company Manual” hyperlink,
the “Section” hyperlink, the “Section 3 Corporate Responsibility” hyperlink, the
“Section 303A Corporate Governance Standards” hyperlink, and the “Section 303A.05
Compensation Committee” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
185
Since precatory proposals are not binding on the board, they are not
deemed by the SEC to conflict with the requirement that the board have the authority
to manage the affairs of the corporation. “In our experience, most proposals that are
cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified action
are proper under state law. Accordingly, we will assume that a proposal drafted as a
recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the company demonstrates otherwise.”
Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act
Release No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, at *7 (Dec. 3, 1976).
186
Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to
Make Shareholder Proposals?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 68 (1998).
187
Thomas & Martin, supra note 57, at 1022.
188
Id. at 1065, quoted in PWP, supra note 4, at 68-69.
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a precatory proposal submitted following the report of a
compensation representative to be at least as effective. Indeed,
such a precatory proposal, even if it does not pass, should be
more effective than those studied by Thomas and Martin, since
the board would realize that the proposal had the support of at
least one major shareholder. If such a precatory proposal were
to pass, one could expect the impact to be even greater,
especially if the precatory proposal were to be accompanied by
the shareholders’ actual rejection of those portions of the
compensation plan submitted for their approval. In the face of
such a rejection, a board would ignore the precatory proposal at
its peril.
d. Flexibility of Compensation Representative
System
As discussed above, one advantage of implementing the
compensation representative system by bylaw is that it would
obviate the need for new legislation.189 A related advantage to
case-by-case implementation is flexibility, especially since the
extent of the CEO compensation problem may vary greatly by
firm.190 For example, at some firms, such as those controlled by
a large independent shareholder, executive compensation may
not be a serious issue, and the controlling shareholder may
have the means and motivation to monitor executive
compensation better than could a compensation representative.
Indeed, empirical studies have indicated that firms with a
shareholder controlling more than five percent of the shares
may already be engaged in significant monitoring,191 and that
189

See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
For evidence that flexibility in matters of corporate governance improves
company performance, see Sridhar R. Arcot & Valentina G. Bruno, One Size Does Not
Fit All, After All: Evidence from Corporate Governance (May 16, 2006) (unpublished
working paper), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=887947 (an empirical study
finding that rigid adherence to “best practices” does not necessarily lead to superior
performance, due to the heterogeneity of circumstances facing different companies).
See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence
Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370 (2002) (arguing that independent directors
are not an unalloyed good, in part because different companies may require different
accountability mechanisms).
191
See, e.g., David et al., supra note 159 (finding that the presence of
institutional owners without significant business ties to a company is associated with
lower levels of CEO pay); Donald C. Hambrick & Sydney Finkelstein, The Effects of
Ownership Structure on Conditions at the Top: The Case of CEO Pay Raises, 16
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175 (1995) (finding that the pay of CEOs at firms containing a
large outside shareholder was tied significantly more strongly to profitability than was
the case at firms without such a shareholder).
190
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the doubling of the percentage holdings of large outside
shareholdings is associated with a twelve to fourteen percent
drop in CEO pay.192 Shareholders of such a firm might see no
benefit to adding an additional layer of bureaucracy on top of
an already well-working system.193
On the other hand, shareholders of an underperforming
firm that is dominated not by an outside shareholder, but by an
unresponsive CEO and his or her complicit board of directors,
may find that the executive compensation system lies at the
heart of the company’s problems. They may discover that the
introduction of a compensation representative both captures
the attention and increases the accountability of the CEO and
the board, to the substantial benefit of shareholders.
In short, rather than mandating a procrustean system
that could lead to unforeseen negative effects, the proposal set
forth in this article would give shareholders, the intended
beneficiaries of the new system, the ability to determine for
themselves whether its adoption addresses their concerns. If it
does, the system will likely be adopted by numerous
corporations, and may evolve into corporate best practice.
Indeed, if it became widely adopted, its benefits could
subsequently be reflected in law. For example, courts could
adopt a different standard of review of executive compensation
depending upon whether a compensation representative was
involved.
Compensation plans involving a compensation
representative could continue to enjoy the deferential waste
standard or could be entirely immunized from judicial review,
while plans adopted without such involvement could be
subjected to a stricter scrutiny. Alternatively, state corporate
law could be amended to provide for compensation
representatives in all cases, unless a company’s articles of
incorporation explicitly opted-out of the system.194 If, on the
192
Richard M. Cyert et al., Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and TopManagement Compensation: Theory and Evidence, 48 MGMT. SCI. 453 (2002), quoted in
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 660.
193
Ironically, since Bebchuk and Fried’s proposal gives nomination rights only
to shareholders holding five percent or more of the company’s shares, the only
companies impacted by their proposal would be the very companies which, statistically
at least, are least likely to have compensation problems.
194
In a similar development, shareholder proposals seem to be affecting
statutory law relating to the election of directors. Currently, under the Delaware
General Corporation Law and the Model Business Corporation Act, a nominee need
only receive a plurality of shareholder votes to be elected to the board. Recently,
however, numerous corporations have received shareholder proposals to require the
resignation of directors who receive less than a majority vote. In response, the
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other hand, the use of compensation representatives provided
no material shareholder benefit, additional corporations could
refrain from adopting it, and those which had adopted it could
repeal it by a simple shareholder vote, without the need for
legislative or judicial action.
VI.

RESPONSES TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS

This article concludes by addressing a few possible
objections to the compensation representative proposal. One
objection might be that another layer of corporate bureaucracy
is unnecessary, since most companies already have a
compensation committee, along with a compensation
consultant, to advise them. But as pointed out by Graef
Crystal, a compensation consultant and long-time critic of
executive pay, the presence of a compensation consultant is no
panacea.195 Quite the contrary:
Ostensibly, compensation consultants were hired by the CEO to
perform an objective analysis of the company’s executive pay
package and to make whatever recommendations the consultant felt
were appropriate. In reality, if those recommendations did not cause
the CEO to earn more money than he was earning before the
compensation consultant appeared on the scene, the latter was
rapidly shown the door. I learned this fact of life early on . . . .196

One might argue that Crystal’s description no longer
applies, since the listing rules of the New York Stock Exchange
now require companies listed thereon to: (i) have a
compensation committee “composed entirely of independent
directors;” and (ii) have a written charter that gives the
compensation committee “sole authority to retain and
terminate” any compensation consultant employed by the
company.197 The mere fact, however, that a member of the
compensation committee is independent for purposes of the
exchange listing rules does not address another major problem
with compensation consultants: the possibility of other, much
Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association Section of Business
Law has recently approved changes to the Model Business Corporation Act which
would permit, among other things, the irrevocable resignation of a director who
receives less than a specified shareholder vote. See Changes in the Model Business
Corporation Act – Proposed Amendments to Chapters 8 and 10 Relating to Voting by
Shareholders for the Election of Directors, 61 BUS. LAW. 399, 421-23 (2006).
195
GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF
AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 218 (1991).
196
Id.
197
Commentary to NYSE Listed Company Manual Rule 303A.05(b)(ii).
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larger contracts between the consultant and the company.
These contracts would be managed by the company’s human
resources department, under the control of the CEO rather
than the compensation committee. Consultants would likely be
very chary of jeopardizing these contracts by taking a tough
line on CEO pay.
Hewitt Associates, a compensation
consultant for Verizon Communications, provides a real-life
example of the problem.
In its role as compensation
consultant, it reports to the compensation committee of the
board. However, in its other consulting roles, it reports
through the corporate hierarchy, and ultimately to the Verizon
CEO. In 2005 it assisted the compensation committee in
devising a CEO pay package worth $19.4 million, a forty-eight
Without passing
percent increase over that of 2004.198
judgment on whether such an increase was justified, in view of
the twenty-six percent decline in Verizon stock over the same
period, the fact that, since 1997, Hewitt Associates has received
more than half a billion dollars in consulting revenue from
Verizon and its predecessor companies does call into question
One suspects that a compensation
its independence.199
representative appointed by the major shareholders might
have viewed such a pay package differently than either the
compensation committee or its compensation consultant did.
Other skeptics of compensation representatives might
contend that it is unfair to give the three largest eligible
shareholders a right not available to the other shareholders,
that is, the right to appoint the representative. The large
shareholders, however, would be entitled to appoint the
representative only if the majority of the shares voted to grant
them that right. There is no obvious reason to paternalistically
deny shareholders the right to vote in line with their perceived
best interests, especially since, as stated above, Delaware law
allows the bylaws to contain any provision relating to the
affairs of the corporation as long as the provision is not
contrary to law or the company’s certificate of incorporation.200
In any event, there is a practical reason to place the
right to appoint the representative in the hands of large
shareholders; namely, there is no good alternative. Even if the
representative were appointed by a vote of all the shareholders,
198
Gretchen Morgenson, Gilded Paychecks: Troubling Conflicts; Advice on
Boss’s Pay May Not Be So Independent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at A1.
199
Id.
200
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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someone would first have to nominate the candidate. Giving
the nomination right to the board would defeat the purpose of
employing a compensation representative, since the
representative would then be neither more nor less accountable
to the shareholders than are other board members, who are
also nominated by the board and elected by the shareholders.
If every shareholder, regardless of the size of its holdings, were
permitted to nominate a candidate, shareholders with only a
small economic stake in the corporation might abuse the
compensation representative to further their own political or
other non-financial agenda. If only those shareholders who
held, say, five percent of the outstanding shares were allowed
to nominate, compensation representatives could never be
nominated for companies which did not have any large
shareholders—precisely the sort of companies in which, as
discussed above, a compensation representative could be most
useful. Also, if there were multiple five percent shareholders
who each nominated competing candidates, smaller
shareholders would have difficulty making an informed
decision among them.
One possible solution to this problem would be to permit
the three largest eligible shareholders jointly to nominate a
single candidate, subject to the approval of the shareholders.
But since the purpose of adopting the compensation
representative system would be to ensure the appointment of a
party independent of the board of directors, the board could not
be allowed to nominate an alternative. As a result, the
shareholder vote would devolve into the empty formality of
electing a candidate without opposition. Having said that, if
shareholders wanted to include a voting procedure into the
bylaw adopting compensation representatives, there is no
obvious policy reason (other than a desire for simplicity) to
prohibit it.
Other skeptics might argue that, although a bylaw
implementing a compensation representative system can be
adopted by a mere shareholder vote, in fact, shareholders will
not approve proxy resolutions opposed by management. After
all, it may be contended, large shareholders vote
Pension funds may
overwhelmingly with management.201
support management, in part at least, in order to secure
201
This concern was part of the motivation behind the SEC’s decision in 2003
to require mutual funds and investment advisors to disclose their actual proxy votes.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 249, 270, and 274 (2003).
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business with the company.202 Other large investors may be
motivated by a desire to gain privileged access to information.203
Neither type of investor, it might be argued, would likely
sacrifice these benefits for the sake of a compensation
representative system.
However, substantial shareholder
benefit can be achieved even if only a small percentage of
companies actually adopt the bylaw, particularly if, as one
might expect, the adopting companies are the very ones with
the most egregious pay arrangements.204 Not only would the
bylaw help to rectify pay practices at the most objectionable
companies, but it might have an in terrorem effect, encouraging
CEOs at other companies to moderate their own pay demands.
Finally, some might suspect that, even if the bylaw were
to pass, large shareholders would not be willing to participate
in the compensation representative system, since the costs to
such shareholders would exceed the benefits. The total costs to
participating shareholders, however, would be trivial. Out-ofpocket costs would be close to zero, since fees for the
compensation representative would be paid by the corporation.
Likewise, the costs of searching for an appropriate
representative should be quite low, particularly for
institutional shareholders that repeatedly appoint the same
representatives for the various corporations in their portfolio.
Costs in time and effort should also be low, since the actual
tasks relating to reviewing, discussing, and, if necessary,
amending the compensation plans would be delegated to the
compensation representative.
The only significant task
required of participating shareholders would be to respond in
those limited instances in which a compensation representative
has objected to the board’s final compensation determination.
202
See Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Would Mutual Funds Bite the Hand
that Feeds Them? Business Ties and Proxy Voting 2 (Feb. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=667625 (revised Jan. 18, 2006) (studying proxy votes of
mutual funds, and finding a “positive relation between the volume of pension business
a fund company does and its propensity to vote with management” on corporate
governance issues).
203
See Stephen Choi, Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 SEC Proxy
Reforms, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 233, 236 n.8 (2000).
204
A recent empirical study of shareholder proposals between the years 2000
and 2004 has indicated that proposals relating to executive compensation have
received less support than those relating to poison pills or board declassification. Still,
proposals relating to executive compensation received majority support at 6.4% of the
applicable corporations in 2003, although, as mere precatory proposals, they were nonbinding on the board. See Jason M. Loring & C. Keith Taylor, Shareholder Activism:
Directorial Responses to Investors’ Attempts to Change the Corporate Governance
Landscape, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 321 (2006).
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CONCLUSION

Given the low costs to participating shareholders, even
modest benefits would be sufficient to justify the use of
compensation representatives. In fact, the potential benefits to
shareholders could be significant.
First, compensation
representatives would provide a means of objectively
evaluating whether a CEO’s pay is excessive. When they find
that a pay package is inappropriate, compensation
representatives could suggest improvements to the package
before it is even submitted to the board. Thus, they would be
more efficacious than the newly mandated disclosure rules,
which merely require corporations to better inform
shareholders about a fait accompli. Second, if the use of a
compensation representative led to lower CEO pay at a given
company, one could expect the pay of other high-ranking
executives at the company to decrease proportionally—hardly a
trivial consideration when the top five executives are receiving
Third, oversight by
9.8% of all corporate earnings.205
compensation representatives could improve the alignment
between executive pay and performance, thereby potentially
enhancing shareholder returns by reducing agency costs.
Fourth, even if compensation representatives brought only
minor benefits for any individual company, they could, if widely
employed, provide substantial benefits to diversified
institutional investors, which could enjoy lower executive pay
and better alignment between pay and performance for each
company in their portfolios.
Finally, compensation
representatives could have a substantial prophylactic benefit
for investors. At a bare minimum, they could help put an end
to the “ratcheting effect” by which CEO pay might otherwise
continue indefinitely to increase without obstruction. This
possibility alone should be enough to encourage investors to
consider introducing compensation representatives, a prudent
solution to excessive CEO pay.

205

See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7.

